The Impacts of Firms’ Technology Choice on the Gender Diﬀerences in Wage and Time Allocation : A Cross-Country Analysis by Shirai Daichi et al.
The Impacts of Firms’ Technology Choice on
the Gender Di?erences in Wage and Time
Allocation : A Cross-Country Analysis
著者 Shirai Daichi, 白井 大地, Nagamachi Kohei, 長
町 康平, Eguchi Naotaka, 江口 直孝
出版者 Institute of Comparative Economic Studies,
Hosei University
journal or
publication title
比較経済研究所ワーキングペーパー
volume 177
page range 1-43
year 2013-04-04
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10114/7991
The Impacts of Firms’ Technology Choice on the Gender
Differences in Wage and Time Allocation: A
Cross-Country Analysis∗
Daichi Shirai†, Kohei Nagamachi‡, Naotaka Eguchi§
March 29, 2013
Abstract
This paper investigates the impacts of firms’ technology choice on the cross-country
variations in gender gaps, especially those of the wage and time devoted to home
production which vary from country to country. For this purpose, we construct a
general equilibrium model with firms’ technology choice as well as home production.
The term technology includes labor market institutions, corporate culture and so on
that would affect the labor productivity of each gender in different ways and reflects
the relative labor abundance of each gender. The numerical results show that the cross-
country variations in both gender wage and time gaps are considerably affected by the
technology choice, suggesting the persistence of the gender gap; and that a convergence
in the technology choice across countries does not imply smaller cross-country variations
in all measure of the gender gaps.
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1 Introduction
There are still much variations in the gender gaps of wage rates and time spent for home
production even among the developed countries, despite the passing equal pay act and equal
opportunity laws and progressing higher education of female. What cause these differences
in both the wage and time gaps across countries? Is there an unique mechanism that will
explain the variations in both wage and time gaps?
This paper investigates a cross-country variation of the gender wage gap (hereafter wage
gap) and the home production time gap (hereafter time gap) among a sample of eight in-
dustrialized nations.*1 We focus on home production hours in spite of focusing on market
work hours by many studies such as Olovsson (2004), Ohanian et al. (2008) and McDaniel
(2011) because home production is more volatile than market hours between countries. In
addition, recent works emphasize importance of relationship between market work and home
production when comparing cross-country differences in time use.*2 But, there is not a single
work which provides a cross-country analysis of time gap except ours, to the best of our
knowledge.
Meanwhile, since last century, increase in female labor supply is observed in many countries
and this tendency will seem to continue. Many developed countries are promoting the partic-
ipation of female in the labor market to achieve work-life balance and deal with the declining
birthrate and aging society. Changing female relative labor supply can lead to technology
and institution change more appropriate to female worker, e.g., directed technical change a`
la Acemoglu (2002). If labor market institution become equalized among countries, what
happens to change the wage gap and the time gap?
In order to answer these questions, we first construct a general equilibrium model of the
gender wage gap with firms’ technology choice and home production of households consist-
ing of two different marital status: single and couple. Firms can choose their production
technologies as well as labor inputs. Depending on the factor abundance and relative cost of
choosing different technologies, firms’ technologies can be biased towards either male or fe-
male, resulting in the wage gap. Term technology in this context can be broadly interpreted,
and it includes labor market institutions, corporate culture, personnel allocation, employment
regulations and social norms that affects workers’ productivities.
We then calibrate parameters in such a way that the equilibrium matches the data under
the calibrated parameters. Except for technology choice, the specification of the model follows
*1 These countries consist of Austria, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom
(U.K.), and the United States (U.S.).
*2 Prescott (2004) stresses the role of the cross-country difference in tax rates in explaining the difference
in market hours worked between U.S. and European countries using a simple neoclassical framework
without home production. Later, Rogerson (2009) reports that home production drastically changes
the relationship between the taxes and market hours worked.
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the standard model in the literature and also focuses on the plainest form in order to make
interpretations easiest. The advantages of this strategy are that given the limited availability
of the time use data, especially on housework, we can still identify all the relevant parameters;
and also that we can still identify the impacts of firms’ technology choice on the gender gaps
which is of our main interest and is clearly defined compared with other possible sources of
the gender gaps which have multiple interpretations due to our calibration strategy.
The model is an application of the Caselli and Coleman (2006)’s framework to the gender
gap context. They consider the relationship between the skill premium and the relative
abundance of skilled workers in order to explain the cross-country differences in income per
worker. We treat the gender gaps instead of the skill premium. Specifically, in our context,
inputs consist of male and female labor, and the technology choice friction is interpreted as
relative costs of choosing different technologies which affect the wage rate of each gender
unevenly. The assumption that firms distinguish male labor and female labor is supported
by the previous literature which suggests that the elasticity of substitution between male
and female in market activities ranges from two to three (Olivetti and Petrongolo, 2011).
One interpretation of relative costs is labor market discrimination such as the taste-based
discrimination discussed by Becker (1971). General equilibrium approach then generates rich
interactions between the wage and time gaps which are often neglected in the labor economics
literatures.
Given this approach, we restate the previous questions as follows: What are the impacts
of firms’ technology choice on the cross-country variation in the observed gender differences
in wage and time allocation. Are the sources of the variations the same for both wage and
time gaps? In order to answer these questions, we conduct counterfactual simulations which
compare equilibria under appropriate and inappropriate technology choice, where firms can
and cannot choose their technology depending on their environments, respectively.
The main finding is that technology choice has considerable impacts on the cross-country
variations in not only the wage gap but also the time gaps of both single and couple households
in the sense that the observed cross-country variation in technology can affect the equilibria of
countries and thus gender gaps significantly. Not surprisingly, technology choice reproduces
a non-negligible part of the observed cross-country variation in the wage gap, and this is
also the case for the time gap of the single households. What is, however, noteworthy is the
contrasting result of the time gap of the couple households. That is, in the case of the couple
time gap, technology choice contributes to a reduction in the cross-country variation. This is
mainly because an important part of the observed cross-country variation in the couple time
gap is due to the cross-country variation in the factors related to home production, the effect
of which and that of technology choice on the cross-country variation offset each other.
Two policy implications are drawn from these results: The first is that there exists the
major difficulties in narrowing the gender gaps. This is because these gaps arises, to a large
extent, from technology choice which is broadly interpreted and thus includes the labor mar-
3
ket institutions, corporate culture and social norms which are difficult to change dramatically.
The second is that the global policy coordination aiming to narrow the gender gaps by affect-
ing firms’ technology choice, even if succeeded to alter firms’ behavior and make differences
in technology choice across countries smaller, might not result in smaller gender gaps in all
measures. Rather, while achieving smaller gaps in the wage gap and time gap of the single
households, such a policy is associated with a widened cross-country variation in the time
gap of the couple households, i.e., in some countries the couple time gap might shrink, but
the other countries might experience higher time gap.
There are some empirical works that conduct an international comparison of gender wage
gap, e.g., Blau and Kahn (1992, 1995, 1996a, 1996b, 2003) and Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008,
2011). In labor economics, institution is one of the main topics as comprehensively reviewed
in, Blau and Kahn (1999), Nickell and Layard (1999) and Boeri (2011). Blau and Kahn
also argued that institutions have a explanatory power of cross-country differences of the
wage gap. However, due to their approach based on the traditional reduced form regression,
they evaluate partial equilibrium effects while we overcome this limitation by using a general
equilibrium model that is able to assess indirect effects of changing equilibria. Another
difference is that while Blau and Kahn treat only observed exogenous effects of institution,
e.g., parental leave and degree of occupational segregation by gender, we assume endogenous
institutions which are included in TFP such as economic growth model, e.g., Jones and
Romer (2010). These treatments can assess some unobserved technology and institution
effect to productivities.
The structure of this paper is as follows: We first provide the model in Section 2. Then we
calibrate the model and quantify the effects of firms’ technology choice on the cross-country
variations in the gender wage and time gaps for a benchmark case in Section 3, which is
followed by the robustness analysis in Section 4. Finally, in Section 5, we conclude the paper.
2 The Model
We consider a closed economy with no capital stock.*3 Economic agents consist of firms,
households and the government. Further, households are divided into two groups: single and
couple. In addition to production activities of firms, home production take place in each
type of households. The government conducts only an income redistribution policy. All the
markets are competitive.
2.1 Firms
Competitive firms use male labor Lm and female labor Lf , which are measured in terms
of efficiency unit. The production technology exhibits constant returns to scale (CRS) and is
*3 In Section 4, this assumption is relaxed in order to perform robustness checks of our main results.
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specified by a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) form:
Y = [(AmLm)σ + (AfLf )σ]
1
σ , σ < 1, (1)
where Y is output, and As is sex-s labor augmenting technology. σ determines the elasticity
1/(1−σ) of substitution between male labor and female labor. This general form of production
function is used in order to take account of the literature. The empirical studies on the
elasticity of substitution is few, but these studies consistently suggest that the elasticity of
substitution ranges from two to three (Olivetti and Petrongolo, 2011).
Like Caselli and Coleman (2006), the model differs from the standard one in that firms
choose their technology levels appropriately, i.e., (Am, Af ):
Aωm + υA
ω
f ≤ B, (2)
where ω, υ and B are all positive parameters. B is interpreted as the inverse measure of
the barrier to the world technology frontier, which means a subset of production technologies
the technologically most advanced country, the country with highest B, can access. The
combination of ω and υ governs the curvature of the country-specific technology frontier
defined by the pair (Am, Af ) implied by (2) at equality. As B increases, or the barrier
diminishes, the technology frontier expands, and firms within a given country can access a
wider subset of production technologies.
υ can be interpreted as the relative cost of shifting to female labor augmenting technology
choice from male one (hereafter relative cost), which reflects all the sources of the gender gap
in the efficiency wage rates other than the relative labor abundance Ls of labor of each sex
s. Assume that Lm = Lf . If υ = 1, then firms choose Am = Af , i.e., there is no gender wage
gap. However, if υ > 1, i.e., the relative cost is higher, firms choose the production technology
in such a way that Am > Af , which results in a gender wage gap. Of course, one possible
interpretation of υ is sex discrimination such as glass ceiling.*4 υ could also reflect working
regulations, the culture in firms and country, preference of managers as well as political or
bargaining balance of each sex or asymmetric effects of government policies, e.g. labor law,
on employment environment of each sex.
Formally, the firms’ profit maximization problem is:
max
{Ls, As}s∈{m,f}
{
[(AmLm)σ + (AfLf )σ]
1
σ − wmLm − wfLf
}
s.t. (2).
*4 Although Arrow (1971) criticized exogenously specified discrimination guessing that free entry of firms
will expel prejudiced employers in the long run, and actually this decreasing trend in discrimination
is estimated by Flabbi (2010), even though we do still observe discrimination. O’Neill (2003) shows
that about 42% of the male-female gap in median earnings in 2000 could not be explained by gender
differences in schooling, experience, and job characteristics. In addition, it is worthy to note that
discrimination captured by υ includes not only prejudice of employers, mentioned by Arrow (1971),
Becker (1971) and among others, but also asymmetric effects of policies. In addition, the degree of and
speed of decrease in discrimination are different across countries. These cross-country variation is more
important when we conduct a cross-country analysis in Section 3.
5
In addition to the usual marginal productivity conditions used to obtain the wage gap
equation:
wmem
wfef
=
em
ef
(
Am
Af
)σ (
Lm
Lf
)−(1−σ)
, (3)
we also have the optimality conditions for technology choice consolidated as*5
Am
Af
= υ
1
ω−σ
(
Lm
Lf
) σ
ω−σ
, (4)
which suggests both endogenous and exogenous comparative advantages work in technology
choice. That is, the relative sex-s augmenting productivity is determined by the relative abun-
dance of sex-s labor and relative cost. Thus, the hourly wage gap wmem/(wfef ) depends
on firms’ technology choice Am/Af as well as the gender gap in the skill es and decreasing
returns to scale, the latter of which is weakened by the technology choice due to the comple-
mentarity between the technology choice and labor supply under the empirically valid case,
i.e., σ/(ω − σ).
2.2 Households
Households are divided into two different groups: single and couple households. The former
consists of a single person, either male or female, while the latter includes both one male and
one female. Unlike single households, members in each couple household can cooperate each
other with respect to their time allocation, implying that the elasticities of labor supply are
different across these two different groups in general (Jones et al., 2003). Thus, letting N∗s
and N denote the measure of the single households of sex s and that of the couple households,
respectively, the total population N of the economy is given by N = N∗m+N∗f +2N , which is
normalized to unity without loss of generality.*6
*5 Here, we assume the interior solution in a sense that all the firms choose the same positive pair of
(Am, Af ). Specifically, we are assuming that the hypothesis that ω/σ > 1/(1 − σ) of the proposition
in Caselli and Coleman (2006) holds. Intuitively, this inequality says that the degree ω/σ of decreasing
returns to scale (DRS) in technology choice dominates the degree 1/(1 − ρ) of the positive circular
causation in technology choice, and thus there is no benefit from perfect specialization, and the optimal
technology choice becomes the interior solution. We verify that the inequality actually holds given the
result of our calibration.
*6 In the quantitative analysis, we calibrate measures (N,N∗m, N∗f ) under the assumption of this household
structure in such a way that the model can match the ratio of the aggregate labor supply of each sex.
Given this calibration procedure and the fact that the real world includes households with memberships
other than those specified in the model, readers should not interpret the household consisting of a couple
in the model literally. Instead, it should be simply interpreted as a virtually representative household
members in which can cooperate each other. Similarly, the single households should be interpreted
as those without cooperation. In what follows, however, we use the single or couple households for
convenience.
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2.2.1 Single Household
A sex-s single household considers home production as well as the standard consumption
and time allocation problem:*7
max
c∗s , g∗, h
∗
M,s, h
∗
N,s≥0
{
α∗s ln(c
∗
s) + (1− α∗s)
(1− h∗M,s − h∗N,s)1−γ
∗
s − 1
1− γ∗s
}
s.t.
c∗s = Hs(g∗s , esh∗N,s) =
[
ξ∗sg
∗
s
η + (1− ξ∗s )(esh∗N,s)η
] 1
η , ξ∗s ∈ (0, 1), η < 1,
(1 + τc)g∗s ≤ (1− τ`)wsesh∗M,s + T, (5)
h∗M,s + h
∗
N,s ≤ 1,
where c∗s is consumption of home goods produced by means of a CRS technology
Hs(g∗s , esh∗N,s) with elasticity of substitution of 1/(1− η), of which inputs consist of market
goods g∗s and effective home production hours, i.e., skill es times home production hour
h∗N,s.*
8 ξ∗s is the weight of market goods in home production of sex-s single households. Let-
ting h∗M,s denote market hours and normalizing the time endowment to unity, 1−h∗M,s−h∗N,s
becomes the leisure time. τc is the consumption tax, τ` the labor income tax, T the lump-sum
transfer per person, ws the wage rate of sex s, α∗s the share parameter for consumption, and
γs the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of leisure defined as the elasticity of leisure with respect
to the wage rate holding the marginal utility of consumption constant, respectively. *9
FOCs state that marginal utility from hours to each activity is balanced each other:*10
α∗s
Hsg
Hs
1− τ`
1 + τc
wses = α∗s
HsNes
Hs ,
or
HsN
Hsg
=
1− ξ∗s
ξ∗s
(
g∗s
esh∗N,s
)(1−η)
=
1− τ`
1 + τc
ws, all s ∈ {m, f}, (6)
where Hsg ≡ ∂Hs/∂g∗s , and HsN ≡ ∂Hs/∂h∗N,s. The interpretation of the first equation above
is as follows: An additional market hour increases labor income net of labor income tax by
(1− τ`)wses, which is equivalent to (1− τ`)/(1 + τc)wses units of market goods. Multiplying
this amount by marginal productivity Hsg of market goods in home production and marginal
*7 The input structure of home production is the same as Becker (1965), who was followed by Olovsson
(2004), Ragan (2013), and Rogerson (2009) among others. For preference, we follow Gronau (1977) as
in Chang and Schorfheide (2003a), and Rogerson (2009).
*8 The inclusion of skill es in the labor input is consistent with the arguments by Gronau(1980, 2008)
that more educated people are more better at implementing their tasks. The assumption that efficiency
in the home work is proportional to that in market activities seems less important when investigating
the time gap which is related to the ratio of efficiencies em/ef more than levels themselves given that
the difference across sexes with respect to the impacts of education on the home productivity are not
decisive (Table 7 in Gronau and Hamermesh (2008)).
*9 Frisch elasticity is usually derived in relation with the intertemporal labor supply elasticity in dynamic
models. Although our model is static, Frisch elasticity of leisure in our static framework is equivalent to
that in dynamic models when utility function specifies a separable leisure function and time separable.
*10 Here, we are assuming that the zero lower bound of h∗M,s does not bind, and this is the case of interest
given that agents within the same group of households are identical.
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utility of consumption α∗s/Hs, we obtain the left hand side (LHS), the marginal utility of an
additional market hour. The right hand side (RHS), the marginal utility of an additional
home hour, has a similar reasoning.
Taking the ratio of each sex results in the effective time gap:
emh
∗
N,m
efh∗N,f
=
{
wm/[(1− ξ∗m)/ξ∗m]
wf/[(1− ξ∗f )/ξ∗f ]
}− 11−η
g∗m
g∗f
. (7)
The ratio is decreasing in the ratio of the efficiency wage ws normalized by the relative weight
(1 − ξ∗s )/ξ∗s of home production due to the opportunity cost and increasing in the ratio of
market goods g∗s due to complementarity. The elasticity of the ratio with respect to the former
is exactly the same as that between market goods and labor input in home production.
2.2.2 Couple Household
A typical couple household differs from a single one in that the budget constraint is con-
solidated; and that members in the household solve a common allocation problem:*11
max
g, {cs, hM,s, hN,s,zs}s∈{m,f}≥0
 ∑
s∈{m,f}
αs ln(cs) + `(1− hM,m − hN,m, 1− hM,f − hN,f )
(8)
s.t.∑
s∈{m,f}
cs = H(g, emhN,m, efhN,f )
=
{
ξgη + (1− ξ) [zm(emhN,m)ρ + zf (efhN,f )ρ]
η
ρ
} 1
η
, ρ < 1, (9)
(1 + τc)g ≤ (1− τ`)
∑
s∈{m,f}
wseshM,s + 2T, (10)
hM,s + hN,s ≤ 1, all s ∈ {m, f}, (11)
where ` is a leisure function, which is strictly increasing, twice continuously differential and
concave, and H is the home production function of which inputs consist of market goods and
the CRS composite of time of both members with elasticity of substitution of 1/(1− ρ). The
crucial difference of the above problem from the single one is that the members in the couple
households can cooperate each other by choosing their time allocation {hM,s, hN,s}s∈{m,f}
for given weights (zm, zf ), which we call zs home production effort, or simply effort, of sex
s hereafter. It is interpreted as human capital, the way how members in a couple household
cooperate each other, and so on. Variables and parameters which have the same notation
except for asterisk have the same meaning as in the case of the single households. The
household with two members receives the lump-sum transfer equal to 2T .
Solving the allocation problem of the home goods, i.e., {cs}s∈{m,f}, we obtain the reduced
form problem, of which FOCs with respect to time allocation state that marginal utility from
*11 In this paper, we do not introduce any strategic behavior between members in the household. The
input structure of the home production function is a direct extension of the single one to the case of
couple households.
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hours to each activity is balanced each other as in the case of single households:*12
Hg
H
1− τ`
1 + τc
wses =
Hses
H , all s ∈ {m, f},
where Hg ≡ ∂H/∂g and Hs ≡ ∂H/∂(eshN,s), and the LHS and RHS are the marginal utilities
of an additional market and home hour, respectively.
Further, taking the ratio of this equation for each sex s gives the effective time gap for the
couple households which is similar to the one in the case of single households:
Hm
Hf =
zm
zf
(
emhN,m
efhN,f
)−(1−ρ)
=
wm
wf
, or
emhN,m
efhN,f
=
(
wm/zm
wf/zf
)− 11−ρ
, (12)
which says that the time gap depends on not only the efficiency wage gap representing the
comparative advantage in market activities but also the effort gap zm/zf , the comparative
advantage in the home production.
This corresponds to (7) in the case of single households, and effort gap zm/zf is the coun-
terpart of the ratio of the relative weight (1− ξ∗s )/ξ∗s . However, the crucial difference appears
in the elasticity of the time gap with respect to the relative efficiency wage gap. The absolute
elasticity of the single households is equal to the elasticity 1/(1− η) of substitution between
the market goods and time spent for the home production while that of the couple households
is equivalent to the one 1/(1− ρ) between the male and female in the home production. The
cooperation between members in a couple household makes the market goods g public goods,
and this is the reason why the above equation has no counterpart of g∗m/g∗f .
2.3 Government
The government levies consumption and proportional labor income taxes on households.
The collected revenues are then used for redistribution through the lump-sum transfer T per
person. Thus, the government budget constraint is
NT = Nτcg +
∑
s∈{m,f}
N∗s τcg
∗
s +
∑
s∈{m,f}
Nτ`wseshM,s +
∑
s∈{m,f}
N∗s τ`wsesh
∗
M,s. (13)
2.4 Equilibrium
Now, we can define a competitive equilibrium of the economy. We focus on a symmetric
equilibrium where firms choose the same technology pair, i.e., (Am, Af ).
Definition. Given a tax system (τc, τ`), a symmetric competitive equilibrium of the economy
is a set of a price system (wm, wf ), time allocation {h∗M,s, h∗N,s, hM,s, hN,s}s∈{m,f}, quantities
({c∗s, cs, g∗s}s∈{m,f}, g, {Ls}s∈{m,f}), technology choice {As}s∈{m,f}, and a lump-sum transfer
T such that
*12 Again, we are assuming the interior solution.
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1. given prices, households maximize their utility;
2. given prices and technology constraint, firms maximize their profit;
3. markets clear:∑
s∈{m,f}
N∗s g
∗
s +Ng = Y, (14)
Ls = N∗s esh
∗
M,s +NeshM,s all s ∈ {m, f}; and (15)
4. the government budget constraint (13) is satisfied.
3 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, conducting counterfactual simulations with the model described in the
previous section, we ask what are the quantitative effects of technology choice on the cross-
country variations in the gender gaps: hourly wage gap wmem/(wfef ), time gap h∗N,m/h
∗
N,f
of the single households, and that hN,m/hN,f of the couple households. The results show
that technology choice has large impacts on all of gender gaps. In addition, it is also shown
that mechanisms determining the time gaps of the single and couple households are different,
implying that the convergence in Am/Af is associated with a convergence in the single time
gap h∗N,m/h
∗
N,f but not in the couple one hN,m/hN,f .
In the following, we first calibrate the model and design the simulation method which allows
us to quantify the effects of technology choice on the gender gaps. We then provide the results
focusing on the importance of technology choice in subsections that follow. In our study we
use cross-section data sets consisting mainly of the Multinational Time Use Study (MTUS),
Survey on Time Use and Leisure Activities (Japan) and EU KLEMS. We will discuss the
detail in AppendixA.
3.1 Calibration
We specify the leisure function ` in the couple households as follows:
`(1− hM,m − hN,m, 1− hM,f − hN,f ) =
∑
s∈{m,f}
(1− αs) (1− hM,s − hN,s)
1−γs − 1
1− γs , (16)
where αs ∈ (0, 1) is the weight of consumption. Stated differently, we assume that within each
couple household, members solve a Pareto problem with equal treatment where the actions
of each member affect the partner’s utility only indirectly.
Given this specification and those laid out in the previous section, we calibrate unknown
variables such as productivities As and consumption (c∗s, cs) and parameters together by solv-
ing the simultaneous equations derived from the FOCs and, in some case, by an estimation.
Intuitively, we assume that under the calibrated parameters, the equilibrium is equivalent to
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the observed data.*13
There are twenty-four parameters, each of which is categorized into one of two types of
parameters: household-side and firm-side parameters. Household-side parameters consist of
preference {α∗s , αs, γs}s∈{m,f}, home production ({ξ∗s , zs}s∈{m,f}, ξ, η, ρ), household structure
({N∗s }s∈{m,f}, N) in workers, skill {es}s∈{m,f}, and tax rates (τc, τ`). Firm-side parameters
consist of the elasticity 1/(1 − σ) of substitution between male and female and technology
constraint (ω, υ,B). The result of the calibration is summarized in Table 16-17.
3.2 Simulation Method
In quantifying the effects of technology choice on the cross-country variations in the gender
gaps, we first consider the effects of a change in the environments on the cross-country
variations in the gender gaps: from the situation where each country are faced with their
calibrated country-specific parameters to the one where all countries have the same U.S.
equivalent level of parameters.
The effects of technology choice is then revealed by comparing two scenarios: In the first
scenario, firms can optimally choose their technology (call this case appropriate technology
choice), and thus there should be no difference across equilibria and thus gender gaps of
countries. In contrast, the second scenario assumes that firms cannot choose their best
technology and thus face with the calibrated Am/Af because of sufficiently high adjustment
costs or, more broadly interpreted, history dependence (call this case inappropriate technology
choice). In this case, we should observe the cross-country variations in the gender gaps which
arise purely due to the cross-country variations in firms’ technology choice before the change
in the environments.
Thus, to the extent that the cross-country variations in the gender gaps observed in the
data are reproduced by the inappropriate technology choice, we can say that the effects
of technology choice on the cross-country variations in the gender gaps are large. More
specifically, by measuring the correlation between the data and the counterfactual under the
inappropriate technology choice (let Corr(CF,Data) denote the correlation) and then by
calculating the ratio of the cross-country variance V ar(CF ) of some gender gap under the
inappropriate technology choice to that V ar(Data) of the corresponding data, we can quan-
tify the impacts of technology choice on the cross-country variations in the gender gaps. If
Corr(CF,Data) < 0, then technology choice itself cannot explain the observed variation, and
from a different perspective the larger V ar(CF )/V ar(Data) is, the more the observed tech-
nology choice affected the variations in the gender gaps. Note that if both Corr(CF,Data)
*13 Since we take the values of elasticities from previous literatures, this calibration approach suggests
that parameters except for elasticities are computed as residuals. This is the reason why we follow the
previous literatures in the specification while keeping the model as plain as possible. Even with the
limited availability of the time use data, this method together with the plain model allows us to identify
the values of parameters. The more detailed procedure is described in AppendixB.
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and V ar(CF )/V ar(Data) are close to one, it can be said that technology choice itself can
explain the observed variations in the gender gaps.
In what follows, we call this method comparing the inappropriate technology choice with
the data the independent experiment of technology choice. A similar method can be applied
to the other sources of the cross-country variation of the gender gaps such as effort zs,
skill es, preference (α∗s , αs) and so on. That is, in order to quantify the impacts of some
factor, we assume counterfactually that countries are different only in this factor and compare
the associated equilibrium with the data. We also call this experiment the independent
experiment.
We also design another type of experiments which we call conditional experiments of tech-
nology choice. A conditional experiment of technology choice is a slight extension of the
independent experiment of technology choice. Specifically, it compares the equilibrium with
one or a few additional cross-country difference(s) in parameters as well as inappropriate
technology choice. Intuitively, this experiment quantify the effects of the combination of sev-
eral sources, including at least technology choice, of the cross-country variation in the gender
gaps.
3.3 Wage Gap
The theoretical implication of inappropriate technology choice for the wage gap is under-
stood by comparing the inappropriate technology choice with appropriate technology choice
where all countries have the same parameter values as the U.S. and firms choose their tech-
nology optimally. Then, the inappropriate technology choice is characterized by a shift of
(Am, Af ) on the U.S.-equivalent technology frontier.
Here suppose, without loss of generality, that Am and Af moves from a northwest point
US, representing the United States or the appropriate technology choice, to a southeast point
i on the U.S.-equivalent technology frontier as shown in Figure 1, i.e., Am and Af increases
and decreases, respectively. Due to the associated changes in the labor productivities, the
wage rate of the males and that of the females increases and decreases, respectively, implying
the efficiency wage gap wm/wf increases given the other things being equal in a way specified
by (3). However, this increase seems to be weakened by the general equilibrium effect or the
associated increase in the relative aggregate labor supply of the males and thus its negative
effect on the wage gap due to the decreasing returns to scale. At least for the single household
decision, the previous literature such as Rogerson (2009) suggests that the single male (female)
household increases (decreases) his (her) time spent on market activities with its response
to the wage rate strengthened by the substitution between market goods and time spent on
his (her) home production. As for the couple households, the integrated budget constraint
makes the sign of the associated change in the household’s labor income ambiguous. Thus,
the above magnification effects of the substitution between market goods and time devoted
to home production on the response of the market hour of each sex are now ambiguous.
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Figure1 Technology Shift on the U.S.-equivalent Technology Frontier
However, even with this ambiguous magnification effect, we might expect that an increase
in the ratio hM,m/hM,f of market hours is a natural consequence of comparative advantage,
and this is actually the case as confirmed by our calculation.
This result is then compared with the observed cross-country variation in the hourly wage
gap wmem/(wfef ) by the independent experiment, which suggests that technology choice
contributes to the cross-country variation in the wage gap to a relatively large extent as
shown by the left panel of Figure 2 and Table 1. The variance ratio V ar(CF )/V ar(Data) of
technology choice is largest among the sources of the gender gaps, 0.346. Not surprisingly,
the correlation Corr(Data,CF ) between the data and counterfactual is positive and fairly
close to one. Independent experiments also suggest that skill es and preference (α∗s , αs) are
also other importance sources of the cross-country variation in the wage gap. The variance
ratios of these are about 78% and 36% of that of technology choice, respectively. The former
is consistent with the literature and, together with the latter, suggests that the importance
of the general equilibrium analysis which can capture the effect of the latter and verified its
relatively large impact on the cross-country variation in the wage gap.
Conditional experiments support the result of the independent experiment that technology
choice is important in understanding the cross-country variation in the wage gap. Both the
variance ratio V ar(CF )/V ar(Data) and correlation Corr(Data,CF ) are robust even if, in
addition to technology choice, we added another source of the cross-country variation of the
gender gaps. Importantly, the pair of technology choice and preference explains the most of
13
V ar(CF )
V ar(Data)V ar Corr(Data,CF )
Data 0.076 — —
Independent Experiments
– Technology Choice Am/Af 0.026 0.346 0.840
– Effort zs 0.002 0.022 0.289
– Skill es 0.020 0.270 0.359
– Preference αs, α∗s 0.009 0.125 0.958
– Tax τ`, τc 0.000 0.001 0.535
– Population N, N∗s 0.001 0.011 -0.627
Conditional Experiments of Technology Choice Am/Af
– Effort zs 0.032 0.423 0.796
– Skill es 0.039 0.510 0.929
– Preference αs, α∗s 0.068 0.893 0.927
– Tax τ`, τc 0.018 0.243 0.854
– Population N, N∗s 0.021 0.275 0.798
– Effort & Preference zs, αs, α∗s 0.075 0.987 0.905
– Skill & Preference es, αs, α∗s 0.084 1.110 0.966
Table1 Counterfactual Experiments: Wage Gap Variation
Notes: “Independent Experiments” shows the effect of the setting of simulated exogenous variable
independently on cross-country variations by comparing to calculate variance and correlation. “Conditional
Experiments of Technology Choice Am = Af” shows the effect of several combinations which all include
technology choice. Other exogenous variables and parameters are set to equal U.S. calibrated values. The
second column from the left shows variance between each sample countries by data and counterfactual
simulations, respectively. The third column calcultes variance ratio of data and counterfactual simulation
that is defined as the second column each row divided by the second column of the first row. The forth
column calculates correlation between data and simulation results.
the cross-country variation of the wage gap with the variance ratio of 0.893 and correlation
of 0.927 as shown in Table 1, and it is noteworthy that the correlation of the combination is
well above the summation of the variance ratios associated with the independent experiments
of technology choice and preference. If we add either effort or skill as well as preference, both
measures become closer to one, but compared with the combination of technology choice and
preference, the improvements are relatively small.
14
3.4 Single Time Gap
Suppose again that technology (Am, Af ) shifts towards southeast on the U.S.-equivalent
technology frontier, and thus the efficiency wage gap wm/wf also increases as shown by the
previous subsection. Each single household then takes these changes as given and chooses the
time h∗N,s devoted to her or his own home production. According to (7), the associated change
in the time gap h∗N,m/h
∗
N,f is the sum of the two counteracting forces: The first derives from
the associated increase in the relative opportunity costs, i.e., the change in (wm/wf )−1/(1−η),
which is negative. The second is positive due to the complementarity between market goods
and time devoted to home production, i.e., the change in g∗m/g
∗
f which seems to increase since
g∗m (g
∗
f ) is likely to increase (decrease) faced with an increase (decrease) in the wage rate wm
(wf ). It is confirmed that the resulting change in the time gap is a decrease.
Then, the question is to what extent this cross-country variation in the time gap induced
by technology choice can explain the observed variation across countries. The independent
experiment suggests that technology choice can explain not all but some non-negligible part
of the cross-country variation in the time gap of the single households. A positive correlation
Corr(Data,CF ) between the data and counterfactual, though much smaller than that in the
case of the wage gap as shown by the center panel of Figure 2 or Table 2, implies that the
cross-country variation induced by technology choice is consistent with the observed variation.
In addition, the value of the variance ratio V ar(CF )/V ar(Data), 0.228, shows that its impact
is not negligible.
The importance of technology choice in understanding the cross-country variation in the
time gap is also suggested by comparisons between the independent experiment of technology
choice with those of the other sources of the cross-country variation. Skill es, which directly
affects the time gap, has the highest variance ratio, 0.478, which is about twice larger than
that of technology choice. However, a negative correlation, −0.164, suggests that skill itself
cannot explain the observed cross-country variation. Among the other sources impacting on
the time gap only through general equilibrium effects, preference has comparable numbers
for both the variance ratio and correlation, 0.216 and 0.242, respectively. Effort, tax and
population, the first of which is closely related to the couple households, are all negligible
impact on the time gap in the sense that the variance ratio is relatively small compared with
that of technology choice.
This conclusion is robust in the sense that even if we allowed additional variations in the
other sources of the gender gaps, both the correlation Corr(Data,CF ) and variance ratio
V ar(CF )/V ar(Data) do not change so much. As shown in Table 2 which reports the results
of several conditional experiments, the correlation Corr(Data,CF ) between the data and
counterfactual is still positive, ranging from 0.089 with skill gap to 0.371 with tax, and the
variance ratio V ar(CF )/V ar(Data) is also far from zero, ranging from 0.158 with tax to
1.184 with skill and preference.
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V ar(CF )
V ar(Data)V ar Corr(Data,CF )
Data 0.032 — —
Independent Experiments
– Technology Choice Am/Af 0.007 0.228 0.330
– Effort zs 0.001 0.017 -0.715
– Skill es 0.015 0.478 -0.164
– Preference αs, α∗s 0.007 0.216 0.242
– Tax τ`, τc 0.000 0.000 -0.004
– Population N, N∗s 0.000 0.008 -0.779
Conditional Experiments of Technology Choice Am/Af
– Effort zs 0.010 0.299 0.127
– Skill es 0.026 0.808 0.089
– Preference αs, α∗s 0.026 0.807 0.285
– Tax τ`, τc 0.005 0.158 0.371
– Population N, N∗s 0.006 0.187 0.257
– Effort & Preference zs, αs, α∗s 0.032 0.973 0.186
– Skill & Preference es, αs, α∗s 0.038 1.184 0.198
Table2 Counterfactual Experiments: Time Gap Variation of Single Households
Notes: “Independent Experiments” shows the effect of the setting of simulated exogenous variable
independently on cross-country variations by comparing to calculate variance and correlation. “Conditional
Experiments of Technology Choice Am = Af” shows the effect of several combinations which all include
technology choice. Other exogenous variables and parameters are set to equal U.S. calibrated values. The
second column from the left shows variance between each sample countries by data and counterfactual
simulations, respectively. The third column calcultes variance ratio of data and counterfactual simulation
that is defined as the second column each row divided by the second column of the first row. The forth
column calculates correlation between data and simulation results.
3.5 Couple Time Gap
Also take as given a southeast shift of technology (Am/Af ) on the U.S.-equivalent frontier.
Then, unlike the single household, we should observe a clear-cut relationship between the
associated increase in the efficiency wage gap wm/wf and the time gap hN,m/hN,f . According
to (12), the couple household chooses its members’ time devoted to home production in such
a way that the female engages in home production more than the male does, or stated
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differently, the time gap hN,m/hN,f is negatively correlated with the efficiency wage gap
wm/wf . Intuitively, market goods g are, though cooperation between members, shared like
public goods within the households, and thus the effects of complementarity between market
goods and time devoted to home production on the time gap cancel out across members, and
only the effects of the opportunity costs prevail, resulting in a perfect log-linear relationship
between the time gap and the wage gap.
Then, to what extent can this cross-country variation in the time gap induced by technology
choice explain the actual variation? What is noteworthy is that the result is in contrast with
the case of the single household. The independent experiment shows that the correlation
Corr(Data,CF ) between the data and counterfactual is negative, about −0.242 as shown in
Table 3 or observed from the right panel in Figure 2, suggesting that technology choice itself
cannot explain the observed cross-country variation in the time gap. That is, the observed
cross-country variation in the time gap of the couple household is driven by some factor(s)
the effects of which are negatively correlated with that of technology choice.
This result, however, does not mean that technology choice is not an importance source
of the cross-country variation in the time gap. In terms of the impact of technology choice
on the cross-country variation in the time gap, which is measured by the variation ratio
V ar(CF )/V ar(Data), technology choice itself has a considerable impact on the time gap
hN,m/hN,f of the couple household. Table 3 reports that the variance ratio is about 0.492.
This impact is robust in the sense that the variance ratio does not change so much and rather
increases when combined with other sources of the cross-country variation of the gender gaps
as shown by conditional experiments.
In addition, technology choice is also important in the sense that there is no single factor
that can explain the actual cross-country variation in the time gap of the couple households.
Although effort zs has a correlation Corr(Data,CF ) between the data and counterfactual
sufficiently close to one, its variance ratio V ar(CF )/V ar(Data) is too large to explain the
cross-country variation. Instead, the combination of technology choice and effort or the
triplet of technology choice, effort and preference has the variance ratio and correlation closer
to one compared with those of either technology choice or effort itself, implying that without
technology choice it is difficult to explain the cross-country variation in the time gap. Among
of these, the latter explains the most of the cross-country variation with the variance ratio of
1.145 and correlation of 0.984.
The above results thus suggest that the mechanisms determining the time devoted to home
production are crucially different across different types of households not only in the sense that
the cooperation between members makes the net effects of the opportunity costs larger but
also in the sense that the actual cross-country variation in the time gap of the couple household
deviates from the prediction with technology choice only to a large extent. An immediate
implication of this result is that the global policy trend, which is expected to narrow the
gender gaps by affecting technology choice and is characterized by the convergence in Am/Af ,
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Figure2 Effects of Technology Choice on the Gender Gaps: Independent Experiment
including Italy
Notes: Figure shows the male-female to ratio each variables. CF (green open circle) are represented counter-
factual simulation results
might not achieve smaller wage and time gaps (at least for that of the couple households)
simultaneously. As shown by independent and conditional experiments, the cross-country
variation in technology choice Am/Af has an offsetting effect on the cross-country variation
in the time gap of the couple households which is widened by the cross-country variation in
effort zs. Thus, if Am/Af ’s of countries converge, the effect of effort becomes larger, resulting
in a more wider cross-country variation in the time gap. This means that in some countries
the time gap become narrower while other countries experience higher time gaps.*14
4 Robustness Analysis
We performed sensitivity checks by changing parameter values, assumptions and utility
function specification within the context of the baseline. Table 4–6 compare the results when
the main experiments are implemented under alternative assumptions. These results show
that the firms’ technology choice can explain the cross–country variance to some extent even
under different assumptions, and thus we concluded that the firms’ technology choice has a
significant impact to the gender wage and time gaps.
Specifically, we conduct four types of sensitivity experiment:
1. Endogenous Home Production Effort
2. With Physical Capital Model
3. Composite Type Utility Function
*14 As shown in Section 4, the result that the correlation between couple time gaps of the data and
counterfactual under inappropriate technology choice is negative is robust to different parameter values
and specifications. Thus, stated differently, the implication that a convergence in Am/Af results in a
divergence in the couple time gap hN,m/hN,f is also a robust result.
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V ar(CF )
V ar(Data)V ar Corr(Data,CF )
Data 0.059 — —
Independent Experiments
– Technology Choice Am/Af 0.029 0.492 -0.242
– Effort zs 0.175 2.943 0.887
– Skill es 0.006 0.099 -0.263
– Preference αs, α∗s 0.013 0.219 -0.111
– Tax τ`, τc 0.000 0.002 -0.161
– Population N, N∗s 0.001 0.018 -0.497
Conditional Experiments of Technology Choice Am/Af
– Effort zs 0.090 1.515 0.964
– Skill es 0.039 0.653 -0.276
– Preference αs, α∗s 0.079 1.324 -0.249
– Tax τ`, τc 0.021 0.359 -0.209
– Population N, N∗s 0.024 0.405 -0.303
– Effort & Preference zs, αs, α∗s 0.068 1.145 0.984
– Skill & Preference es, αs, α∗s 0.080 1.351 -0.275
Table3 Counterfactual Experiments: Time Gap Variation of Couple Households
Notes: “Independent Experiments” shows the effect of the setting of simulated exogenous variable
independently on cross-country variations by comparing to calculate variance and correlation. “Conditional
Experiments of Technology Choice Am = Af” shows the effect of several combinations which all include
technology choice. Other exogenous variables and parameters are set to equal U.S. calibrated values. The
second column from the left shows variance between each sample countries by data and counterfactual
simulations, respectively. The third column calcultes variance ratio of data and counterfactual simulation
that is defined as the second column each row divided by the second column of the first row. The forth
column calculates correlation between data and simulation results.
4. Changing Elasticity of Substitution Values
Different from calibration forms and simulation algorithm of baseline model are discussed in
AppendixD.
4.1 Endogenous Home Production Effort
The home production effort, or simply effort, zs is given exogenously in main experiments,
so even, when firm changes technology choice, home production effort doesn’t change. For
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V ar(CF )/V ar(Data) Independent Experiments Conditional Experiments
Technology Skill Preference Skill & Skill Preference
Choice Preference
Baseline 0.35 0.27 0.12 1.11 0.51 0.89
4.1: Endogenous effort 0.23 0.36 0.09 0.95 0.51 0.60
4.1 + 4.2: With capital 0.53 0.56 0.34 1.03 0.70 0.87
4.1 + 4.2 + 4.3: Alt. Utility func. 0.69 0.70 0.23 1.07 0.89 1.06
4.4: 1/(1− ρ) = 1.11 0.37 0.24 0.13 1.14 0.51 0.96
4.4: 1/(1− ρ) = 3.33 0.32 0.31 0.11 1.07 0.52 0.81
4.4: 1/(1− σ) = 1.4 0.27 0.09 0.19 1.13 0.43 0.92
4.4: 1/(1− σ) = 2.6 0.44 0.39 0.10 1.09 0.55 0.93
corr(Data, CF ) Independent Experiments Conditional Experiments
Technology Skill Preference Skill & Skill Preference
Choice Preference
Baseline 0.84 0.36 0.96 0.97 0.93 0.93
4.1: Endogenous effort 0.84 0.36 0.95 0.91 0.85 0.93
4.1 + 4.2: With capital 0.84 0.35 0.96 0.95 0.90 0.93
4.1 + 4.2 + 4.3: Alt. Utility func. 0.84 0.35 0.85 0.92 0.89 0.89
4.4: 1/(1− ρ) = 1.11 0.84 0.36 0.96 0.97 0.94 0.93
4.4: 1/(1− ρ) = 3.33 0.84 0.36 0.96 0.95 0.91 0.93
4.4: 1/(1− σ) = 1.4 0.93 0.37 0.96 0.95 0.87 0.98
4.4: 1/(1− σ) = 2.6 0.75 0.35 0.96 0.97 0.95 0.87
Table4 Robustness Analysis of Wage Gap Variation
example, if firm decides to enhance life work balance to work more easily for female workers,
the couple household may change each spouses function and husband may work more home
production. Then, male’s home production effort will increase due to changing comparative
advantage. In this subsection, we examine such a effect to effort. The couple household can
choose the effort under constraint of technology frontier in home production with a similar
fashion to firms’ technology choice problem. The couple household maximizes the utility
function including below constraint,
zωHm + υHz
ωH
f ≤ BH . (17)
This constraint plays a role similar to the technology choice problem of the firm side. BH
is the inverse measure of the barrier to household technology frontier, υH is the relative
cost of shifting to spouse’s home production productivity and ωH governs the curvature of
household technology frontier. If ρ > 0, which is the case we consider in this paper, that
ωH > 1 guarantees an interior solution of the household.
The FOCs with respect to zm and zf and taking the ratio of this equation for each sex s,
zm
zf
= υ
1−ρ
(1−ρ)ωH−1
H
(
wm
wf
)− ρ(1−ρ)ωH−1
,
imply that the home production effort changes due to comparative advantage of market work.
When we calibrate zm and zf by data, we restrict to zm + zf = 1 as main experiments
settings to identify parameters. But, when calculating simulation, we can identify it without
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V ar(CF )/V ar(Data) Independent Experiments Conditional Experiments
Technology Skill Preference Skill & Skill Preference
Choice Preference
Baseline 0.49 0.10 0.22 1.35 0.65 1.32
4.1: Endogenous effort 1.58 1.37 0.69 7.38 3.95 4.40
4.1 + 4.2: With capital 1.29 1.24 0.97 2.84 2.01 2.27
4.1 + 4.2 + 4.3: Alt. Utility func. 1.67 0.97 0.02 2.57 2.11 0.27
4.4: 1/(1− ρ) = 1.11 0.16 0.07 0.07 0.60 0.21 0.43
4.4: 1/(1− ρ) = 3.33 1.26 0.90 0.60 4.82 2.60 3.57
4.4: 1/(1− σ) = 1.4 0.39 0.32 0.35 1.20 0.49 1.59
4.4: 1/(1− σ) = 2.6 0.64 0.03 0.17 1.43 0.75 1.38
corr(Data,CF ) Independent Experiments Conditional Experiments
Technology Skill Preference Skill & Skill Preference
Choice Preference
Baseline -0.24 -0.26 -0.11 -0.27 -0.28 -0.25
4.1: Endogenous effort -0.22 -0.36 -0.13 -0.22 -0.25 -0.25
4.1 + 4.2: With capital -0.25 -0.36 -0.16 -0.24 -0.27 -0.28
4.1 + 4.2 + 4.3: Alt. Utility func. -0.26 -0.33 0.27 -0.22 -0.25 0.42
4.4: 1/(1− ρ) = 1.11 -0.24 0.20 -0.10 -0.17 -0.13 -0.23
4.4: 1/(1− ρ) = 3.33 -0.25 -0.33 -0.13 -0.25 -0.27 -0.27
4.4: 1/(1− σ) = 1.4 -0.11 -0.29 -0.13 -0.25 -0.23 -0.19
4.4: 1/(1− σ) = 2.6 -0.28 -0.25 -0.10 -0.29 -0.30 -0.27
Table5 Robustness Analysis of Time Gap Variation of Couple Households
this restriction that does not need any more, i.e., zm + zf 6= 1.
4.2 With Physical Capital Model
In this subsection, the endogenous home production effort model is further extended to
include capital stock that is given exogenously. Each household have one unit of capital stock
k and rent it to firms to at a rental rate r. The total capital stock equals to Nk = K. The
couple and the single household’s budget constraint are added capital income,
Couple household: (1 + τc)g ≤ (1− τ`)(wmemhMm + wfefhMf ) + (1− τk)2rk + 2T,(18)
Single household: (1 + τc)g∗s ≤ (1− τ`)wsesh∗M,s + (1− τk)rk + T, (19)
where τk is the capital income tax, r is the rental rate of capital and k is a per capita physical
capital, k ≡ K/N.
The government’s budget constraint also changes as including capital income tax revenue,
NT = Nτcg +
∑
s∈{m,f}
N∗s τcg
∗
s +
∑
s∈{m,f}
Nτ`wseshM,s +
∑
s∈{m,f}
N∗s τ`wsesh
∗
M,s + τkK.(20)
FOCs of household are same as the main model.
Firms then use capital, labor and technology to produce output according to the two-tier
production function,
max
K, {Ls, As, K}s∈{m,f}
{Y − wmLm − wfLf − rK},
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V ar(CF )/V ar(Data) Independent Experiments Conditional Experiments
Technology Skill Preference Skill & Skill Preference
Choice Preference
Baseline 0.23 0.48 0.22 1.18 0.81 0.81
4.1: Endogenous effort 0.17 0.39 0.18 0.93 0.64 0.63
4.1 + 4.2: With capital 0.53 0.62 0.59 1.16 0.87 1.07
4.1 + 4.2 + 4.3: Alt. Utility func. 0.67 0.48 0.44 1.10 0.88 1.17
4.4: 1/(1− ρ) = 1.11 0.24 0.51 0.23 1.27 0.86 0.85
4.4: 1/(1− ρ) = 3.33 0.21 0.44 0.20 1.08 0.74 0.74
4.4: 1/(1− σ) = 1.4 0.18 0.73 0.30 1.08 0.71 0.91
4.4: 1/(1− σ) = 2.6 0.29 0.37 0.18 1.23 0.86 0.81
corr(Data,CF ) Independent Experiments Conditional Experiments
Technology Skill Preference Skill & Skill Preference
Choice Preference
Baseline 0.33 -0.16 0.24 0.20 0.09 0.29
4.1: Endogenous effort 0.39 -0.16 0.23 0.22 0.11 0.32
4.1 + 4.2: With capital 0.33 -0.16 0.28 0.27 0.13 0.31
4.1 + 4.2 + 4.3: Alt. Utility func. 0.33 -0.15 0.36 0.31 0.21 0.35
4.4: 1/(1− ρ) = 1.11 0.33 -0.17 0.24 0.20 0.09 0.29
4.4: 1/(1− ρ) = 3.33 0.33 -0.16 0.24 0.20 0.09 0.29
4.4: 1/(1− σ) = 1.4 0.38 -0.17 0.24 0.21 0.08 0.27
4.4: 1/(1− σ) = 2.6 0.28 -0.16 0.24 0.19 0.09 0.27
Table6 Robustness Analysis of Time Gap Variation of Single Households
Y = Kθ [(AmLm)σ + (AfLf )σ]
1−θ
σ (21)
s.t. Aωm + υA
ω
f ≤ B,
where θ is the capital share and 0 < θ < 1.
4.3 Composite Type Utility Function
The utility function in baseline model is separable between consumption, leisure and each
spouses. We examine whether we would obtain the same results under the different specifica-
tions for the household utility function. In this subsection, we chose the following specification
which deal with the composite hours of leisure between husband and wife:
max
 ∑
s∈{m,f}
αs ln(cs) + b ln
{
[am(1− hM,m − hN,m)² + af (1− hM,f − hN,f )²]
1
²
} ,(22)
where ² < 1 governs the elasticity 1/(1− ²) between the male and female in leisure activities.
4.4 Elasticity of Substitution
Unfortunately, to our knowledge, there are no empirical studies on the elasticity of substi-
tution of home production between couples, i.e., 1/(1− ρ). Some previous studies of gender
gap give this elasticity with lack of foundation. However, sharing roles of home production
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may be affected by this elasticity. So, we checked sensitivity of the value of elasticity.
And, there are few empirical works that estimated the elasticity of substitution between
male labor and female labor, 1/(1 − σ). Our baseline simulation is based on mean value of
those works and we checked sensitivity of this value, too.
4.5 Results
We conduct several alternative specification and parameters checks to verify the robustness
of the findings reported above. We do not experiment about effort, because home production
effort are determined endogenously in these models, except baseline model. Table 4–6 show
that there are no siginificant difference among each specification and parameter settings. We
can conclude that our results are robust.
5 Conclusion
To what extent and how does firms’ technology choice affect the cross-country variations
in the gender gap in wage and time allocation?
In order to answer the question, we build a general equilibrium model of the gender wage
gap and time allocation with technology choice and home production of households with
different marital status. Firms choose their production technology depending on the relative
abundance of labor of each sex and relative costs of shifting their technology.
The main finding is that technology choice has considerable impacts on the cross-country
variation in not only the gender wage gap but also the gender difference of time allocation,
implying that effects of a policy aiming to narrow the gender gaps are gradual since it must
face with firms’ technology choice including the labor market institutions, corporate culture
and social norms which are difficult to change dramatically. It is also shown that there is
no single mechanism determining the observed cross-country variations in the gender gaps.
Therefore, the convergence in the technology choice across countries itself does not result
the convergence in all measures of the gender gaps in general, suggesting that policy makers
should set multiple targets when intending to narrow all measures of the gender gaps.
Possible extension is of course to introduce the bargaining in the household problem taking
into account of the literature of the collective model (cf. Bourguignon et al. (2009)).
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AppendixA Data
AppendixA provides details of the data which we use for calibration and simulation.
A.1 Gross Domestic Product
We uses per worker GDP denoted by y. GDP data is based on value added in the EU
KLEMS. We convert national currency-measure GDP into 1997-basis PPP value and ex-
clude government expenditures. The government expenditures data are obtained from OECD
statistics. The numbers of workers (number of persons engaged) are also obtained from EU
KLEMS.
A.2 Time Allocation
The data source of time allocation differs depending on countries. For countries except for
Japan, we use Multinational Time Use Study (MTUS), and Survey on Time Use and Leisure
Activities for Japan. The procedure of the construction of time allocation consistent with the
model is discussed below for each statistics.
A.2.1 Multinational Time Use Study (MTUS)
The time allocation data for market working hours and home production hours are obtained
from the Multi-National Time Use Study (MTUS). This data set contains the time allocation
of individuals among countries. There are several versions of the data available, such as World
5.53, World 5.8 and World 6.0. Difference among these three versions are, that latter two
versions include participants aged less than 18 and time allocation data are in more detailed
way, while World 5.53 are categorized in broader way. In order to divide time allocation of
a day into three blocks, market work, home production and leisure, respectively, the World
5.53 fully satisfies our aim. The countries included in World 5.53 are listed in the Table 7.
MTUS time use data is given in a form of a diary collected from the individuals. Records of
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Country Survey Years
Austria 1992
Germany 1991-92, 2001-02
Italy 2002-03
Netherlands 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005
Spain 2002-03
United Kingdom 1995, 2000-01, 2005
United States 1992-94 , 2003
Table7 MTUS: Countries and Survey Years
one’s behaviors are divided into harmonized 41 activities and for each activity, the amount of
time allocated measured in the unit of minute are available. Therefore we have constructed the
definition of time allocation for market work, home production and leisure, and reallocated
former 41 activities into each category. Specifically we choose 4 variables to indicate the
market work and 5 variables for home production and all the others as leisure. Details are
shown in the Table 8 and Table 9.
Next we describe the methodology for constructing the time use data consistently for our
analysis. We have dropped the individuals who are not employed (including the retired
person) and the ages are restricted to the range of 20 to 60. Both students and samples
with military duty has been omitted. Also, we ignored the diaries recorded on weekends and
people working approximately less than 25 hours a week, or working more than 70 hours a
week. The upper bound for home production hours are set to 10 hours a day. After filtering
out the noisy samples, we left with a following countries that has sufficient sample size for
constructing our time allocation data.
Construction method for time allocation variables are fairly simple. We have aggregated
all the individuals’ time allocation from their diaries which satisfies our requirements and
employed the mean value as the representing time allocation for the economy. The basic
statistics are shown in the Table 10 and 11.
A.2.2 Survey on Time Use and Leisure Activities
We obtained the time allocation data for Japan from the aggregated data of Survey on
Time Use and Leisure Activities (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Statistics
Bureau of Japan.). Construction methods for our variables are almost the same as MTUS.
We defined worked hours as the market working hours hM,s {s ∈ m, f}, and housework as
the home production hN,s {s ∈ m, f}, respectively. The data are shown in the Table 12.
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Variable Name Variable Label Variable Name Variable Label
AV1 Paid work AV21 Walking
AV2 Paid work at home AV22 Religious activities
AV3 Paid work, second job AV23 Civic activities
AV4 School, classes AV24 Cinema or theatre
AV5 Travel to/from work AV25 Dances or parties
AV6 Cook, wash up AV26 Social clubs
AV7 Housework AV27 Pubs
AV8 Odd jobs AV28 Restaurants
AV9 Gardening AV29 Visit friends at their homes
AV10 Shopping AV30 Listen to radio
AV11 Childcare AV31 Watch television or video
AV12 Domestic travel AV32 Listen to records, tapes, cds
AV13 Dress/personal care AV33 Study, homework
AV14 Consume personal services AV34 Read books
AV15 Meals and snacks AV35 Read papers, magazines
AV16 Sleep AV36 Relax
AV17 Free time travel AV37 Conversation
AV18 Excursions AV38 Entertain friends at home
AV19 Active sports participation AV39 Knit, sew
AV20 Passive sports participation AV40 Other leisure
AV41 Unclassified or missing
Table8 Definition of harmonized activities in MTUS
Variable MTUS Variables
Market Work AV1, AV2, AV3, AV5
Home Production AV6, AV7, AV8, AV9, AV10
Leisure All the others
Table9 Definition of time allocation for market work, home production and leisure
AppendixB Calibration
In this section, we describe the detailed procedure of our calibration. Table 13 shows all
variables in the baseline model. Variables are classified three types. First, “Data” represents
that these variables are given by data directly. Second, “Exogenous parameters” are mainly
taken from the previous studies. Third, “Calibrated parameters” are given by equations
presented below.
We first calibrate the household structure ({N∗s }s∈{m,f}, N), skill {es}s∈{m,f}, and tax
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Variable Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max
Austria
hMm 696 0.357 0.157 0.010 0.573
hMf 696 0.327 0.244 0.042 0.573
hNm 696 0.048 0.074 0.000 0.396
hNf 696 0.142 0.093 0.000 0.365
Germany
hMm 1767 0.334 0.157 0.003 0.580
hMf 1767 0.317 0.277 0.035 0.580
hNm 1767 0.070 0.078 0.000 0.368
hNf 1767 0.107 0.090 0.000 0.309
Italy
hMm 368 0.343 0.140 0.063 0.576
hMf 368 0.300 0.236 0.139 0.549
hNm 368 0.042 0.054 0.000 0.319
hNf 368 0.119 0.088 0.000 0.264
Netherlands
hMm 2855 0.358 0.160 0.010 0.573
hMf 2855 0.234 0.212 0.010 0.542
hNm 2855 0.052 0.066 0.000 0.396
hNf 2855 0.118 0.107 0.000 0.354
Spain
hMm 1016 0.356 0.155 0.014 0.569
hMf 1016 0.331 0.270 0.014 0.576
hNm 1016 0.048 0.061 0.000 0.438
hNf 1016 0.106 0.081 0.000 0.271
United Kingdom
hMm 963 0.335 0.169 0.014 0.576
hMf 963 0.320 0.253 0.007 0.552
hNm 963 0.055 0.069 0.000 0.431
hNf 963 0.071 0.046 0.000 0.365
United States
hMm 2474 0.348 0.166 0.003 0.580
hMf 2474 0.333 0.308 0.007 0.580
hNm 2474 0.052 0.077 0.000 0.417
hNf 2474 0.069 0.059 0.000 0.299
Table10 Basic Statistics (Couples)
rates (τc, τL), which are independently calibrated, in the household side. Then, given the
result and also fixed exogenous parameters, we calibrate the firm side parameters. Finally,
we calibrate the rest of parameters in the household side.
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Variable Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max
Austria
h∗M,m 269 0.355 0.174 0.021 0.552
h∗M,f 269 0.338 0.118 0.073 0.573
h∗N,m 269 0.067 0.086 0.000 0.406
h∗N,f 269 0.097 0.078 0.000 0.365
Germany
h∗M,m 676 0.345 0.163 0.007 0.576
h∗M,f 676 0.329 0.168 0.014 0.569
h∗N,m 676 0.062 0.060 0.000 0.326
h∗N,f 676 0.088 0.076 0.000 0.347
Italy
h∗M,m 179 0.338 0.187 0.132 0.569
h∗M,f 179 0.304 0.024 0.014 0.542
h∗N,m 179 0.053 0.056 0.000 0.292
h∗N,f 179 0.092 0.044 0.000 0.243
Netherlands
h∗M,m 1815 0.345 0.194 0.010 0.573
h∗M,f 1815 0.309 0.013 0.010 0.573
h∗N,m 1815 0.057 0.062 0.000 0.365
h∗N,f 1815 0.077 0.051 0.000 0.281
Spain
h∗M,m 282 0.324 0.169 0.014 0.576
h∗M,f 282 0.313 0.127 0.007 0.576
h∗N,m 282 0.063 0.062 0.000 0.368
h∗N,f 282 0.098 0.034 0.000 0.340
United Kingdom
h∗M,m 507 0.337 0.197 0.007 0.569
h∗M,f 507 0.295 0.032 0.007 0.573
h∗N,m 507 0.056 0.069 0.000 0.361
h∗N,f 507 0.077 0.054 0.000 0.438
United States
h∗M,m 2002 0.352 0.181 0.001 0.578
h∗M,f 2002 0.335 0.122 0.002 0.580
h∗N,m 2002 0.052 0.077 0.000 0.410
h∗N,f 2002 0.066 0.069 0.000 0.451
Table11 Basic Statistics (Singles)
B.1 Independently Calibrated Parameters
Household Structure
Main purpose of our paper is to investigate the aggregate gender gap. This requires that
the male-female ratio of labor supply in our model should match the data. To do this,
we calibrate the household structure to fit the male-female ratio of labor supply data. Our
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Austria Germany Italy Japan Netherlands Spain UK US
Lm/Lf 1.37 1.04 0.69 2.49 2.49 1.39 1.12 1.40
Lf 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.07
Lm 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.10
N 0.35 0.37 0.34 0.29 0.38 0.41 0.43 0.34
N∗f 0.18 0.16 0.19 0.19 0.14 0.10 0.08 0.18
N∗m 0.12 0.10 0.13 0.24 0.11 0.07 0.07 0.14
em/ef 1.43 1.11 0.69 1.77 1.88 1.37 1.09 1.45
ef 0.41 0.48 0.59 0.36 0.35 0.42 0.48 0.41
em 0.59 0.52 0.41 0.64 0.65 0.58 0.52 0.59
h∗M,m/h
∗
M,f 1.05 1.05 1.11 1.23 1.12 1.04 1.14 1.05
h∗M,f 0.34 0.33 0.30 0.28 0.31 0.31 0.29 0.34
h∗M,m 0.36 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.32 0.34 0.35
h∗N,m/h
∗
N,f 0.68 0.70 0.58 0.22 0.75 0.65 0.72 0.79
h∗N,f 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.07
h∗N,m 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05
hM,m/hM,f 1.09 1.05 1.14 1.30 1.53 1.08 1.05 1.05
hM,f 0.33 0.32 0.30 0.25 0.23 0.33 0.32 0.33
hM,m 0.36 0.33 0.34 0.32 0.36 0.36 0.34 0.35
hN,m/hN,f 0.34 0.65 0.36 0.07 0.44 0.46 0.77 0.79
hN,f 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.07 0.07
hN,m 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05
τc 0.20 0.19 0.23 0.13 0.23 0.17 0.17 0.07
τ` 0.41 0.41 0.38 0.25 0.37 0.30 0.29 0.21
wm/wf 0.77 1.46 1.30 0.96 0.65 0.93 1.45 0.99
wf 0.18 0.15 0.13 0.29 0.23 0.13 0.13 0.24
wm 0.14 0.21 0.17 0.28 0.15 0.12 0.19 0.24
wmem/(wfef ) 1.11 1.62 0.90 1.69 1.22 1.28 1.58 1.44
y 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04
Table12 Data
Data : N, N, N∗s , τc, τ`, ws, hM,s, h∗M,s, hN,s, h∗N,s, ∀s ∈ {m, f}
Exogenous parameters : σ, ρ, η, γs, γ∗s , ∀s ∈ {m, f}
Calibrated parameters : As, B, ω, α∗s , αs, υ, ξ, ξ∗s , zs, υ, cs, c∗s, g, g∗s , T, ∀s ∈ {m, f}
Table13 Variable list
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model’s population consist of three groups that couple household N with a male and a female,
male single household N∗m and female single household N∗f , the members of which consist of
only a male and a female, and so we calibrate three parameters N, N∗m, N
∗
f . Matched labor
supply ratio, we also use Census by each countries to calibrate as much as possible to fit
the Census household structure. The reason why we need additional target, not only labor
supply ratio but also household structure, is because household structure system in our model
requires two calibration target to satisfy rank conditions.
Except for Japan and U.S., we use EU statistics on income and living conditions which
reports the distribution of population by household types. This database contains no infor-
mation about the age profile and presence or absence of children by gender for single person.
So, we assume that single person with dependent children has the same ratio by gender. We
calculated,
N∗s =
Single person ratio− Single person with dependent children ratio
Single person ratio
× Single person by sex ratio,
N = Two adults younger than 65 years.
Japan’s household structure data are obtained from Ministry of Internal Affairs and Com-
munications, Census, 2005 and U.S. one are obtained from Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract
of the United States, 2009. We use below figures,
N∗s = Household living alone by sex,
N = Married Couple without children.
Finally, we normalize total number of households N =
∑
s∈{m,f}N
∗
s +N to unity.
Skill
Skill es is calibrated by human capital accumulated in schooling. Specifically, we employ
the similar methodology stated in Caselli and Coleman (2006) to construct the skill data
using EU KLEMS (Release March 2008). As mentioned earlier, the skill is defined as a
sum of daily working hour ratio per worker where workers are divided into three groups for
their respective schooling; low, medium and high education. We set low educated group as
a baseline and take a weighted sum of the medium and high educated workers relative to
low educated workers. The weights for accumulation is a relative labor income per unit of
working hours to the baseline group. The skill measure is independently constructed for male
and female. Then, each skill is normalized by total sum of both efficiency unit.
Tax Rates
Both consumption and labor income tax rates are taken fromMcDaniel (2007). She provides
these tax rates as well as taxes on investment and capital for fifteen OECD countries.
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B.2 Firm-side Parameters
For the firm side parameters, we first calibrate the hourly gender wage gap wmem/(wfef ),
and fix the value of the elasticity of substitution between market hours of male and female,
1/(1−σ). Then, using these results as well as those of the independently calibrated parameters
and MTUS, we calibrate (Am, Af ) for eight countries. Finally, we conduct a regression which
salvages the values of (ω, υ,B) under a certain assumption.
Hourly Gender Wage Gap
Hourly gender wage gap wmem/(wfef ) is calculated from real labor compensation level and
total hours worked by male and female workers. Both variables are obtained from the EU
KLEMS data. Note that the skill ratio can be obtained from the result of B.1. Hourly wage
rate can be defined as the real labor compensation level divided by the total hours worked
by each groups of workers.
Elasticity of Substitution between Market Hours of the Male and Female Labor
We choose σ = 0.52, which implies that the elasticity of substitution between market hours
worked of males and females is 2.08. This is included in the empirically plausible range,
from 2 to 3. Olivetti and Petrongolo (2011) surveys studies of the elasticity of substitution
between market hours of males and females. Layard (1982) reports the value of 2 for the
United Kingdom. Lewis (1985) reports 2.3 for Australia. For the United States, Weinberg
(2000) and Acemoglu et al. (2004) report 2.4 and 3, respectively.
Labor Augmenting Technologies
The values of (Am, Af ) are given by the following equations:
Am =
Y
Lm

(
wmem
wfef
)
Lm(
wmem
wfef
)
Lm + emef Lf

1
σ
, Af =
Y
Lf
 emef Lf(
wmem
wfef
)
Lm + emef Lf
 1σ .
These are obtained from the hourly wage gap equation (3) and the production function (1).
We have already obtained the hourly wage gap wmem/(wfef ) and the skill ratio em/ef . For
output of the market goods, we use the GDP net of the government expenditure. The data
source and calculation are explained in AppendixA. For Ls, we use the labor market clearing
condition (15) with data of market hours obtained from MTUS and the household structure
calibrated previously. Note that Y in the above equation corresponds to the GDP per capita
if we normalize the total population N of the economy to unity.
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Estimation of ω
The parameter ω of technology frontier can be estimated through the following equation
derived from the firms’ optimality conditions. We recall from equation (4),
Am
Af
= υ
1
ω−σ
(
Lm
Lf
) σ
ω−σ
.
Assuming that ω and σ are constant across all countries, we then built a fixed-effect model.
Taking logarithm and first-difference of both sides leads to the following specification,
dlog
(
Am,i,t
Af,i,t
)
=
σ
ω − σdlog
(
Lm,i,t
Lf,i,t
)
+ FE,
where FE = 1ω−σdlog (υt). Note that this specification implicitly assumes the time trend of
υ, which cannot appear in our static model but in the data.
In order to perform the estimation of the above equation, we have constructed the (unbal-
anced) panel data from 1981 to 2005 for 14 countries. That is, Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Czech, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, Spain, U.K. and U.S.
The descriptive statistics are shown in Table 14 and the estimated results are in Table 15.
Since the estimated values correspond to the coefficients of the first term in the right-hand
side of the equation, the parameters ω = 1.12 can be calculated easily for a given σ. These
estimation results are consistent with our assumption that the solution to the firm’s problems
is interior, i.e., ω > σ/(1− σ).
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
dlog(Am/Af ) 322 -0.031 0.047 -0.290 0.099
dlog(Lm/Lf ) 322 -0.024 0.040 -0.304 0.103
Table14 Descriptive statistics
Variables dlog
(
Am
Af
)
dlog(Lm/Lf ) 0.866***
(0.047)
Observations 322
Adjusted R2 0.69
Implied Parameter (ω) 1.12
Notes: Reported in the table are the results from fixed effects panel regressions. Standard errors in
parentheses. *** significant at the 1% level.
Table15 Estimation Results
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Relative cost υ and Technology Frontier B
After estimating ω, we can calculate the relative costs υ and shift parameter B analytically.
υ is computed from firm side FOCs of As,
υ =
(
Am
Af
)ω−σ (
Lm
Lf
)−σ
,
and B is computed by using the technology constraint (2),
B = Aωm + υA
ω
f .
B.3 Household-side Parameters
For the rest of the household-side parameters, we first choose the values of elasticities. Then,
using MTUS and FOCs of the households’ problem, we calibrate {ξ∗s , α∗s}s∈{m,f} related to
the single household and ({zs}s∈{m,f}, ξ, {αs}s∈{m,f}) related to the couple household in
order.
The Inverse of the Frisch Elasticity of Leisure
We set γs = γ∗s = 0.9 which is close to the value, 1, chosen by Prescott (2004). According
to Rogerson (2009), who studies a model of time allocation with home production which has
the same specification as our model, time allocation does not depend on the value of the
Frisch elasticity of leisure so much.
Elasticity of Substitution between Home Goods and Composite Time
We conduct our quantitative analysis with several values of η in the range of 0.4 to 0.6,
which is the empirically plausible range the literature suggests. As a study using macro data,
McGrattan et al. (1997) report the range of 0.40 to 0.45. Instead, Chang and Schorfheide
(2003b) report the range of 0.55 to 0.60. Micro studies report similar ranges. Rupert et al.
(1995) report the range of 0.40 to 0.45. Aguiar and Hurst (2007) report the range of 0.50 to
0.60.
Elasticity of Substitution between Male’s and Female’s Time devoted to Home Production
We set ρ = 0.5 which implies that the value of the elasticity of substitution between time
devoted to home production of a male and a female is 2. We also consider other values for ρ
in order to check the robustness of our result in Section 4.
Wage Rates and Lump-sum Transfer
In order to calibrate the rest of the household-side parameters, we use FOCs of the house-
holds’ problem. However, we need the values of wage rates {ws}s∈{m,f} and the lump-sum
transfer T , which are consistent with the model and previous calibration.
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The wage rate ws is given by the marginal productivity condition.
The lump-sum transfer T is given by
T = (τc + τ`)
(N
N
) ∑
s∈{m,f}
wseshM,s +
∑
s∈{m,f}
(
N∗s
N
)
wsesh
∗
M,s
 ,
which is obtained by substituting the budget constraints of households, (5) and (10), into the
government budget constraint and solving the result for T .
Single Household
For the single household, we first calibrate ξ∗s by
ξ∗s =
(esh∗N,s)
η−1
g∗η−1s 1−τ`1+τcws + (esh
∗
N,s)η−1
, all s ∈ {m, f},
which is obtained from (6). g∗s is computed by using the budget constraint (5). We use MTUS
for time allocation, i.e., h∗M,s and h
∗
N,s.
Given the value of ξ∗s , we then calibrate α
∗
s using one of FOCs:
α∗s =
(1− h∗M,s − h∗N,s)−γ
∗
s
(1− h∗M,s − h∗N,s)−γ∗s +
(1−ξ∗s )(esh∗N,s)η−1es
ξ∗sg
∗η
s +(1−ξ∗s )(esh∗N,s)η
, all s ∈ {m, f}.
Couple Household
For the couple household, we first calibrate {zs}s∈{m,f} by
zf =
1(
wm
wf
)(
emhN,m
efhN,f
)1−ρ
+ 1
, zm = 1− zf ,
the former of which is given by substituting zm = 1− zf into (12) and solving the result for
zf .
Then, given this result, we obtain the value of ξ by
ξ =
[zm(emhNm)ρ + zf (efhNf )ρ]
η
ρ−1 zs(eshNs)ρ−1
gη−1 1−τ`1+τcws + [zm(emhNm)
ρ + zf (efhNf )ρ]
η
ρ−1 zs(eshNs)ρ−1
,
which is obtained from (12) with s = m.
Finally, we obtain {αs}s∈{m,f} by
αm =
D2D3
D1
+D4 −D3
D2D3
D1
+D4 +D3
, αf = 1− D2
D1
(1− αm),
where
D1 ≡ wmem
wfef
, D2 ≡ (1− hM,m − hN,m)
−γm
(1− hM,f − hN,f )−γf ,
D3 ≡ ξg
η−1
ξgη + (1− ξ)(zm(emhNm)ρ + zf (efhNf )ρ)
η
ρ
1− τ`
1 + τc
wmem, D4 ≡ (1− hM,m − hN,m)−γm .
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Parameter Value Description
1/(1− η) 2.00 EOS b/w g and hN,s
γs = γ∗s , s ∈ {m, f} 0.90 the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of leisure
ω 1.12 firm production technology frontier curvature
1/(1− ρ) 2.00 EOS b/w hN,m and hN,f
1/(1− σ) 2.10 EOS b/w Lm and Lf
ωH 3.00 home production technology frontier curvature
Note: EOS = elasticity of substitution
Table16 Exogenous parameters
This system of equations is obtained by solving
D1 =
1− αm
1− αf D2,
D3 =
1− αm
αm + αf
D4,
which are obtained from FOCs, for (αm, αf ).
AppendixC Algorithm for Computing a Competitive Equilibrium
Exogenous parameters: υ, ω, B, υH , ωH , BH , ξ, αm, αf , em, ef , zm, zf , σ, η, τc, τ`,
ρ, N , N∗, N
Endogenous variables: Am, Af , wm, wf , hMm, hMf , hNm, hNf , hN , Lm, Lf , y, T , g,
cm, cf , U
To compute a competitive equilibrium, we use the following algorithm to obtain endogenous
variables:
Step 1: Make an initial guess: {wm = w0m, wf = w0f , T = T 0} and hM,s,1 = 0.1, hM,s,n =
0.7 are given.
Step 2: For the given lower and upper bounds, hM,s,1 and hM,s,n, generate the equidistant
grid, i.e., hM,m,i ∈ {hM,m,1, · · · · · · , hM,m,n}, hM,f,i ∈ {hM,f,1, · · · · · · , hM,f,n}, i =
1, 2, · · · , n.
Step 3: Compute the system: ∀i = 1, · · · , n set
(10) : gi =
1− τ`
1 + τc
(wmemhM,m,i + wfefhM,f,i) +
2T
1 + τc
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Austria Germany Italy Japan Netherlands Spain UK US
Am/Af 1.20 2.63 1.67 2.82 1.38 1.76 2.66 1.88
Af 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.08
Am 0.09 0.14 0.10 0.21 0.10 0.08 0.13 0.16
B 0.11 0.17 0.14 0.23 0.11 0.09 0.15 0.19
α∗f 0.58 0.59 0.52 0.45 0.53 0.52 0.50 0.47
α∗m 0.55 0.52 0.53 0.42 0.52 0.48 0.47 0.45
αf 0.61 0.66 0.52 0.59 0.54 0.59 0.60 0.56
αm 0.53 0.44 0.55 0.27 0.49 0.44 0.37 0.36
c∗f 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.36 0.32 0.29 0.30 0.36
c∗m 0.34 0.36 0.31 0.44 0.35 0.30 0.35 0.42
cf 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04
cm 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03
g 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.08
g∗f 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03
g∗m 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.05
υ 0.76 1.55 1.35 0.97 0.62 0.94 1.54 1.01
ξ 0.88 0.87 0.88 0.84 0.86 0.88 0.87 0.83
ξ∗f 0.90 0.92 0.91 0.87 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.87
ξ∗m 0.93 0.91 0.92 0.93 0.92 0.92 0.90 0.88
zf 0.65 0.45 0.61 0.75 0.63 0.58 0.43 0.48
zm 0.35 0.55 0.39 0.25 0.37 0.42 0.57 0.52
υH 0.42 1.82 0.84 0.33 0.38 0.69 1.93 1.06
BH 0.16 0.33 0.25 0.15 0.15 0.21 0.34 0.26
Table17 Calibrated parameters
(hN,m,i, hN,f,i)

(1− ξ) [zm(emhN,m,i)ρ + zf (efhN,f,i)ρ]
η
ρ−1
ξgηi + (1− ξ) [zm(emhN,m,i)ρ + zf (efhN,f,i)ρ]
η
ρ
zm(emhN,m,i)ρ−1em
=
1− αm
αm + αf
(1− hM,m,i − hN,m,i)−γm
(1− ξ) [zm(emhN,m,i)ρ + zf (efhN,f,i)ρ]
η
ρ−1
ξgηi + (1− ξ) [zm(emhN,m,i)ρ + zf (efhN,f,i)ρ]
η
ρ
zf (efhN,f,i)ρ−1ef
=
1− αf
αm + αf
(1− hM,f,i − hN,f,i)−γf .
(23)
=⇒ Solve the simultaneous equation for (hN,m,i, hN,f,i)
(9) : cm,i =
αm
αm + αf
{
ξgηi + (1− ξ) [zm(emhN,m,i)ρ + zf (efhN,f,i)ρ]
η
ρ
} 1
η
,
FOC of cs,i : cf,i =
αf
αm
cm,i
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(8) : Ui =
∑
s∈{m,f}
{
αs ln(cs,i) + (1− αs) (1− hM,s,i − hN,s,i)
1−γs − 1
1− γs
}
,
The above two equations of (23) are the FOC of hNs on couple household problem .
Step 4: Compute (hM,m,opt, hM,f,opt) = argmaxhM,m,i, hM,f,i Ui, i = 1, · · · , n
Step 5: If |hM,m,opt−hM,m,opt+1| < ², then set hM,m = hM,m,opt and hM,f = hM,f,opt and
proceed to Step 6.
If |hM,m,opt − hM,m,opt+1| > ², then set
hM,s,1 = hM,s,opt − 0.1d,
hM,s,n = hM,s,opt + 0.1d, s ∈ {m, f}
where d ≡ |hM,s,1 − hM,s,n| and return to Step 2.
Step 6: Solve the equation for h∗M,s, s ∈ {m, f}
α∗sξ
∗
s
1−τ`
1+τc
wses
g∗s
[
ξ∗s + (1− ξ∗s )
(
ξ∗s
1−ξ∗s
1−τ`
1+τc
ws
) η
η−1
] = (1− α∗s)
[
1− h∗Ms −
(
ξ∗s
1− ξ∗s
1− τ`
1 + τc
ws
) 1
η−1 g∗s
es
]−γ∗s
(24)
Step 7: Compute (g∗s , h∗N,s, Ls) by
(5) : g∗s =
1− τ`
1 + τc
wsesh
∗
M,s +
T
1 + τc
,
(6) : h∗N,s =
g∗s
es
(
ξ∗s
1− ξ∗s
1− τ`
1 + τc
ws
) 1
η−1
(15) : Ls = N∗s esh
∗
M,s +NeshM,s.
In addition, compute (Am, Af ) as follows: In the case of appropriate technology choice,
then
(2) + (4) : Af =
B
1
ω(
υ + υ
ω
ω−σ
) (
Lm
Lf
) ωσ
ω−σ
(2) : Am =
(
B − υAωf
) 1
ω ,
In the case of inappropriate technology choice, then
Af =
(
B
A
ω
+ υ
) 1
ω
,
Am = AAf ,
where A is a exogenous technology parameter.
After calculating Am and Af , compute (ws, T ) by
FOC of Ls : ws = [(AmLm)σ + (AfLf )σ]
1
σ−1(AsLs)σ−1As,
(5) + (10) + (13) : T =
τc + τ`
N
{N(wmemhMm + wfefhMf )
+N∗m(wmemh
∗
Mm) +N
∗
f (wfefh
∗
Mf )
}
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Step 8: Set Λ = 0.5 and compute
w1s = Λw
0
s + (1− Λ)wm
T 1 = ΛT 0 + (1− Λ)T
Step 9: If
√
(w1m − w0m)2 + (w1f − w0f )2 + (T 1 − T 0)2 > ², then set w0s = w1s , T 0 = T 1 and
return to Step 1.
If
√
(w1m − w0m)2 + (w1f − w0f )2 + (T 1 − T 0)2 < ², then stop.
AppendixD Robustness
In this section, we present calibration forms and simulation algorithm that are different
from benchmark model. The results of calibration and simulation are available upon request.
D.1 Endogenous Home Production Effort
D.1.1 Calibration Forms
In this endogenous home production model, the only difference from the benchmark
model is including home production technology frontier that has three unknown parameters
(ωH , υH , BH). We set ωH = 3 exogenously to avoid corner solutions. For the remaining two
parameters υH and BH , we derive analytically solutions,
υH =
(
zm
zf
)ωH−1(emhNm
efhNf
)−ρ
, (25)
BH = zωHm + υHz
ωH
f , (26)
the former of which is obtained from the FOCs with respect to zs.
D.1.2 Simulation Algorithm
We substitute
zf =
 BH
υH +
{
υH
(
emhNm
efhNf
)ρ} ωHωH−1

1
ωH
,
zm = (BH − υHzωHf )
1
ωH ,
(23) in Step 3 of the simulation algorithm in AppendixC.
D.2 With Physical Capital Model
D.2.1 Calibration Forms
Couple Household:
k =
K
N
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Austria Germany Italy Japan Netherlands Spain UK US
k 0.19 0.21 0.14 0.28 0.15 0.10 0.11 0.14
θ 0.37 0.35 0.36 0.44 0.35 0.39 0.28 0.36
τk 0.18 0.13 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.20 0.31 0.27
Table18 Capital stock data
(18) + (19) + (20) : T =
τc + τ`
N
{N(wmemhMm + wfefhMf ) +N∗m(wmemh∗Mm)
+N∗f (wfefh
∗
Mf )
}
+ (τc + τk)rk
(18) : g =
1− τ`
1 + τc
(wmemhMm + wfefhMf ) +
(1− τk)2rk
1 + τc
+
2T
1 + τc
Single Household:
(19) : g∗s =
1− τ`
1 + τc
wsesh
∗
M,s +
(1− τk)rk
1 + τc
+
T
1 + τc
,
Firm:
FOC of K : θ =
rK
Y
(21) + FOC of Ls : As =
1
Ls
(
Y
Kθ
) 1
1−θ
[
wsLs
wmLm + wfLf
] 1
σ
FOC of Ls : ws = (1− θ)Kθ[(AmLm)σ + (AfLf )σ]
1−θ
σ −1(AsLs)σ−1As
Remaining variables and parameters are the same as benchmark model.
D.2.2 Data
This model requires a real capital stock data k, capital compensation to GDP ratio θ and
capital income tax rate τk. Capital stock and capital compensation to GDP ratio are obtained
from the EU KLEMS 2009 version and capital income tax rate are obtained from McDaniel
(2007) (see Table 12). EU KLEMS 2009 is the newest version,but this does not include detail
labor statistics, such as labor compensation by gender and by skill. So, we also use EU
KLEMS 2008 version to use labor data.
D.2.3 Simulation Algorithm
1. In Step 1 of algorithm in AppendixC, add “r = r0 and r0 is given”.
2. In Step 3, use
g =
1− τ`
1 + τc
(wmemhMm + wfefhMf ) +
1− τk
1 + τc
2rk +
2T
1 + τc
.
3. In Step 7, use
g∗s =
1− τ`
1 + τc
wsesh
∗
M,s +
1− τk
1 + τc
rk +
T
1 + τc
,
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ws = (1− θ)Kθ[(AmLm)σ + (AfLf )σ] 1σ−1(AsLs)σ−1As,
T =
τc + τ`
N
{
N(wmemhMm + wfefhMf ) +N∗m(wmemh
∗
Mm) +N
∗
f (wfefh
∗
Mf )
}
+ (τc + τk)rk,
and add the following equations,
(21) : Y = Kθ [(AmLm)σ + (AfLf )σ]
1−θ
σ ,
FOC of K : r =
θY
K
.
4. In Step 8, add
r1 = Λr0 + (1− Λ)r.
5. In Step 9, modify the convergence criterion,√
(r1 − r0)2 + (w1m − w0m)2 + (w1f − w0f )2 + (T 1 − T 0)2 < ².
D.3 Composite Leisure Function
With this specification, we calibrate ² in such a way that ² is consistent with the Frisch
elatsticity of labor supply reported in the previous studies. Thus we first derive the form of
the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. We use the reduced couple household’s problem,
max
g, {hM,s, hN,s, zs}
{
ln[H(·)] + b˜ ln
(
[am(1− hM,m − hN,m)² + af (1− hM,f − hN,f )²]
1
²
)}
s.t. H(g, emhN,m, efhN,f ) =
{
ξgη + (1− ξ) [zm(emhN,m)ρ + zf (efhN,f )ρ]
η
ρ
} 1
η
,
(1 + τc)g ≤ (1− τ`)
∑
s∈{m,f}
wseshM,s + 2(1− τk)rk + 2T, (27)
hM,s + hN,s ≤ 1, all s ∈ {m, f},
zωHm + υHz
ωH
f ≤ BH ,
am + af = 1
where b˜ ≡ b/(αm + αf ).
From FOCs of hMs,
b˜
as`
²−1
s
am`²m + af `²f
= χ(1− τ`)wses, ∀s, (28)
where χ is the Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint. We further take the total
differentiation of this equation and suppose dχ = 0,
−b˜
[
²(am`²m + af `
²
f )
−2am`²−1m d`m + ²(am`
²
m + af `
²
f )
−2af `²−1f d`f
]
as`
²−1
s
+b˜(²− 1) (am`²m + af `²f)−1 as`²−2s d`s = χ(1− τ`)esdws, ∀s. (29)
Using (28), we obtain,
− ² am`
²
m
am`²m + af `²f
d`m
`m
− ² af `
²
f
am`²m + af `²f
d`f
`f
− (1− ²)d`s
`s
=
dws
ws
, ∀s ∈ {m, f}. (30)
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Finally, substituting dwf/wf = 0 for (30) and solving for
d`m/`m
dwm/wm
, we obtain the Frisch
elasticity of labor supply for male,
φm ≡ d`m/`m
dwm/wm
∣∣∣∣
dwf=dχ=0
= −
(
1 +
²
1− ²
af `
²
f
am`²m + af `²f
)
. (31)
D.3.1 Calibration Forms
Couple Household: We solve the following equation for ² numerically,
(31) : φm = −
(
1 +
²
1− ²
af `
²
f
am`²m + af `²f
)
,
where 1/φm2 is set to the value, 2, many macroeconomic studies use. am and af are computed
by
FOC of hMm/hMf : am =
wmem
wfef
(
1−hM,m−hN,m
1−hM,f−hN,f
)1−²
1 + wmemwfef
(
1−hM,m−hN,m
1−hM,f−hN,f
)1−²
af = 1− am.
b˜ is obtained from
FOC of hMm : b˜ =
ξgη−1
ξgη + (1− ξ)[zm(emhN,m)ρ + zf (efhN,f )ρ]
η
ρ
1− τ`
1 + τc
wmem
am`
²
m + af `
²
f
am`
²−1
m
.
The other parameters are computed in the same way as in the benchmark case.
D.3.2 Simulation Algorithm
In Step 3 of the simultaneous equation of Algorithm in section D.2.3, replace the FOC of
hMm and hMf with
(1− ξ)
Φ
[zm(emhN,m)ρ + zf (efhN,f )ρ]
η
ρ−1zmeρmh
ρ−1
N,m = b˜
am`
²−1
m
am`²m + af `²f
(1− ξ)
Φ
[zm(emhN,m)ρ + zf (efhN,f )ρ]
η
ρ−1zfe
ρ
fh
ρ−1
N,f = b˜
af `
²−1
f
am`²m + af `²f
,
and also replace the utility with
U =
{
ln[H(·)] + b˜ ln
(
[am(1− hM,m − hN,m)² + af (1− hM,f − hN,f )²]
1
²
)}
.
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